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ACCOUNTING FOR AWARDS: AN EXAMINATION OF JUROR
REASONING BEHIND PAIN AND SUFFERING DAMAGE
AWARD DECISIONS
KRYSTIA REED, VALERIE P. HANS & VALERIE F. REYNAt
ABSTRACT
What do civil jurors think about when they are asked to make damage
award decisions? Given the secrecy of the jury deliberation process, often
we are unaware of jurors' thought processes. This Article presents the
results from three studies in which mock jurors explained the reasoning
behind their damage awards for pain and suffering. We highlight the most
common explanations and distinguish between reasons justifying high and
low pain and suffering awards. We conclude with a discussion for what
this means for attorneys during trial.
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INTRODUCTION
In 2011, a thirteen-year-old student identified as "Chantay M." was
supposed to be on a school bus for special education students; instead, a
t Cornell University. Authors would like to thank Rebecca Helm for her contributions to the
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research assistance. Preparation of this Article was funded by National Science Foundation grant SES-
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fellow student offered her a ride but then sexually assaulted her. Several
months later, three female students attacked Chantay M. in the school's
locker room, leaving her with a concussion and traumatic brain injury. At
a jury trial in 2018, Chantay M.'s lawyers convinced the jury that the high
school was negligent because of its failure to adequately monitor Chantay
M., making her vulnerable to both attacks. The jury awarded $28 million,
with $8 million for past pain and suffering and $20 million for future pain
and suffering.'
Chantay M.'s record-breaking damage award for pain and suffering
might lead people to wonder, "How did the jury decide on this award?"
However, this question generally cannot be answered in the American
justice system given the secrecy of jury deliberations. Although the
increasing use of post-verdict interviews by trial consultants and the media
can provide some insight into the reasons that jurors offer to justify their
decisions in some trials, 2 in most instances we are unaware of the
reasoning behind jury verdicts. Plaintiffs, defendants, attorneys, judges,
and the general public are often in the dark in terms of understanding the
basis for a jury's damage award.
Empirical studies on jury decisions offer one opportunity to
understand the jury's reasons for damage award decisions. This Article
reviews the insight empirical researchers can provide. Part I discusses
what we know about juror reasoning; it focuses on the legal and
psychological background. Part II presents the results from three studies
in which we asked mock jurors to explain the reasoning behind their pain
and suffering damage awards. Part Ill concludes with a discussion of what
the jurors' responses mean for trial attorneys and the legal system.
I. JUROR REASONS
One essential principle of the American justice system is that jury
deliberations should remain secret under almost all circumstances.3 As
Justice Cardozo once wrote, "Freedom of debate might be stifled and
1. Andrew Denney, Westchester Jury Awards $28M in Physical, Sexual Assault of High
School Student, N.Y. L.J. (Dec. 3, 2018),
https://www.law.com/newyorklawjournal/2018/1 2/03/westchester -jury-awards-28m-in-physical-
sexual-assault-of-high-school-student/?slreturn-20190319145019.
2. See, e.g., Abraham S. Goldstein, Jury Secrecy and the Media: The Problem of Postverdict
Interviews, 1993 U. ILL. L. REV. 295, 296 (1993) (discussing the dangers of media postverdict
interviews invading the sanctity of the jury room).
3. Under the no-impeachment rule, jurors are prohibited from testifying about deliberations
except as it relates to improper attention to extraneous prejudicial information, outside influence, or
mistake on the verdict form FED. R. EvtD. 606(b). The Supreme Court has held that the exceptions
should only apply in the gravest and most important cases. United States v. Reid, 53 U.S. 361, 366
(185 1); see also Pefia-Rodriguez v. Colorado, 137 S. Ct. 855, 878 (2017) (reiterating the holding in
Reid and finding that verdicts based on racial stereotypes may be exceptions to the no-impeachment
rule given the importance of protecting the Sixth Amendment). Although these cases involve
postverdict impeachment efforts, some scholars argue that courts are increasingly emphasizing
preverdict secrecy. Alison Markovitz, Jury Secrecy During Deliberations, 110 YALE L.J. 1493, 1493-
94, 1515 (2001) (arguing that secrecy restrictions pre-verdict should be relaxed).
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independence of thought checked if jurors were made to feel that their
arguments and ballots were to be freely published to the world."4 The
American system has opted out of encouraging jurors to provide reasons
for their verdicts, whereas other countries are increasingly requiring juries
to justify their decisions.5 This Part outlines what psychological research
tells us about the reasoning behind jury decisions about damage awards.
A. Heuristics and Biases
Asking jurors for the reasoning behind their damage awards relies on
what psychologists refer to as metacognition. Metacognition is a person's
"awareness and understanding of [a person's] own thought processes." 6
People with better metacognitive abilities are often better at problem
solving7 and are better at providing justification for their decisions because
they understand their own thought processes better.
Extensive research on the process of human cognition and decision-
making confirms that people do not make decisions purely based on logic. 8
Certain heuristics 9 and biases may consciously or unconsciously influence
jurors, and many of these are unlikely to be reflected in their metacognitive
reasoning. Consider three common and well-studied heuristics: the
availability heuristic, the recency effect, and the phenomenon of
anchoring.1 0 The availability heuristic refers to the fact that people assess
the frequency of an event, in part, by how easily instances of the event
come to mind. " In the recency effect, information heard more recently
4. Clark v. United States, 289 U.S. 1, 13 (1933).
5. Kayla A. Burd & Valerie P. Hans, Reasoned Verdicts: Oversold?, 51 CORNELL INT'L L.J.
319, 320 (2018) (describing the use of reasoned verdicts, justifications for them, and objections to
them); see also Stephen C. Thaman, Should Criminal Juries Give Reasons for Their Verdicts?: The
Spanish Experience and the Implications of the European Court of Human Rights Decision in Taxquet
v. Belgium, 86 CHI.-KENT L. REv. 613, 629 (2011) (describing European experience with reasoned
verdicts in light of Taxquet decision).
6. Metacognition, OXFORD LvItNG DICTIONARIES (2019).
7. See, e.g., H. Lee Swanson, Influence of Metacognitive Knowledge and Aptitude on Problem
Solving, 82 J. EDUC. PSYCHOL. 306, 306 (1990); see also Keith E. Stanovich & Richard F. West,
Individual Differences in Rational Thought, 127 J. EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOL.: GEN. 161, 161 (1998)
(finding that metacognitive abilities are associated with judgment and decision performance). But see
Keith E. Stanovich & Richard F. West, Individual Differences in Reasoning: Implications for the
Rationality Debate?, 23 BEHAV. & BRAIN Sct. 645, 706 (2000), for more recent formulations that
distinguish biases in judgment and decision-making from metacognitive monitoring.
8. See DANIEL KAHNEMAN, THINKING, FAST AND SLOW 4 (2011); see also Antoine Bechara
& Antonio R. Damasio, The Somatic Marker Hypothesis: A Neural Theory of Economic Decision, 52
GAMES & ECON. BEHAV. 336, 346, 368 (2005) (finding that damage to brain regions in charge of
emotions results in slower or worse decisions).
9. Heuristics are principles that reduce the difficulty of complex decision-making by using
simpler judgmental operations. See, e.g., Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Judgment Under
Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases, 185 SCIENCE 1124, 1124 (1974). Using heuristics can be efficient,
but on occasion can produce systematic errors injudgment. Id. at 1130.
10. Seeid. at 1127.
11. The traditional availability heuristic is when people assess the probability of an event based
on the ease with which they can think of instances of that event. Id. The more retrievable, relevant, or
salient information is, the more people focus on that information. Id. The availability heuristic could
lead jurors to rely more on evidence that comes easily to mind and less on evidence they do not think
of as readily.
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tends to have a greater impact than information heard earlier in time.1 2
Thus, jurors might be more likely to mention factors that come to mind
easier or were heard most recently than other factors that, in reality,
equally influenced their decisions.' 3 Additionally, the provision of a
numerical anchor tends to influence people's judgments-an influence
that can operate without conscious awareness. ' 4 A suggested dollar value
(whether relevant or irrelevant to the case) might strongly influence jurors'
damage award decisions even if jurors do not recognize that the value
affected their decision.
Moreover, post hoc justifications, 5 made after a decision has already
been reached, might not fully capture the emotional, intuitive dimensions
of the judgment jurors are making. 16 In response to research supporting
both the benefits of metacognition and the unconscious influence of
12. "An order bias occurs when the order in which information is presented impacts the end
decision made by the decision-maker. Recency is a specific type of order bias whereby the most recent
information received has greater bearing on the [decision-maker's] judgment than other available
information." Vicky Arnold, Philip A. Collier, Steward A. Leech & Steve G. Sutton, The Effect of
Experience and Complexity on Order and Recency Bias in Decision Making by Professional
Accountants, 40 ACCT. & FUN. 109, 110 n.l (2000) (finding recency effects exist regardless of
accounting experience). The Belief-Adjustment Model suggests that the recency bias applies in all
complex decision domains. Robin M. Hogarth & Hillel J. Einhorn, Order Effects in Belief Updating:
The Belief-Adjustment Model, 24 COGNITIVE PSYCHOL. 1, 7 (1992); see also James L. Farr & C.
Michael York, Amount of Information and Primacy-Recency Effects in Recruitment Decisions, 28
PERSONNEL PSYCHOL. 233, 233 (1975) (finding many recency effects and some primacy effects in
hiring decisions).
13. See Farr & York, supra note 12.
14. Anchoring and adjusting occur when people make a final judgment adjusted from some
initial value (the anchor). Tversky & Kahneman, supra note 9, at 1128. The source of the initial value
can be provided by the individual or by an outside source and can also be relevant or irrelevant to the
decision. In most cases, adjustments are typically insufficient, resulting in judgments that are close in
value to the anchor. Id.
15. The sensemaking intuition model argues that, rather than rationally reasoning decisions,
people try to make sense of their decisions post hoc in uncertain conditions. Scott Sonenshein, The
Role of Construction, Intuition, and Justification in Responding to Ethical Issues at Work. The
Sensemaking-Intuition Model, 32 ACAD. MGMT. REV. 1022, 1022 (2007); see also Jonathan St. B.T.
Evans, Heuristic and Analytic Processes in Reasoning, 75 BRIT. J. PSYCHOL. 451, 451 (1984)
(discussing the fallacies in post hoc justifications).
16. Jonathan Haidt, The Emotional Dog and Its Rational Tail: A Social Intuitionist Approach
to Moral Judgment, 108 PSYCHOL. REV. 814, 814 (2001) [hereinafter Haidt, The Emotional Dog and
Its Rational Tail]. Haidt argues that people assess their gut reaction to determine whether their
evaluation of the moral dilemma is positive or negative; however, deliberative reasoning-the kind of
careful, slow, step-by-step evaluation that we might anticipate of legal fact finders-is only
infrequently a causal factor leading to a morally based decision. Id. at 818-19. Haidt asserts that moral
emotions such as anger and disgust directly lead to the moral judgment and that reasons for judgment
tend to emerge mainly when individuals are asked to explain or justify their moral decisions. Id. at
830. In one experiment, Haidt and colleagues had participants read stories about acts that appeared to
be intuitively immoral but were not, in actuality, harmful. Jonathan Haidt, F. Bj6rklund & Scott
Murphy, Moral Dumbfounding: When Intuition Finds No Reason 5 (Aug. 10, 2000) (unpublished
manuscript, University of Virginia). Participants evaluated whether the acts were moral or immoral
and were asked to explain the basis for their judgments. However, participants often had great trouble
explaining why apparently immoral but not harmful acts were immoral. They generated reasons for
their judgments, but the reasons followed rather than preceded the quick intuitive judgment of
immorality. The experiment shows how reasons might well follow, rather than precede, a person's
judgment. At the least, Haidt's research suggests that we should be mindful of the post hoc nature of
some reason-giving for legal decisions.
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heuristics, researchers have argued that people actually use a "hodge-
podge of self-management techniques picked up from our culture and our
individual experience." 7 Psychological research indicates that individuals
who are asked to make a moral decision often form a quick and intuitive
judgment about what should be the right outcome in the case. '8 If asked to
explain themselves, people can generate reasons post hoc, even though the
proffered reasons may not include all the influences on their moral
judgments.' 9 Under this perspective, people can metacognitively explain
their reasoning and decisions, but only partially. Thus, jurors may be able
to identify some-but probably not all-of the factors that influence
them.2
0
Given these limitations, is it a fool's errand to ask mock jurors to
provide accounts of their reasons for their awards? We think not. First, it
allows our participants to offer justifications for their decisions, giving us
the opportunity to learn from them directly how they subjectively
experience and respond to the request for damage awards. They may
generate reasons we have not considered as possible rationales. In turn,
these accounts may help lawyers develop more effective advocacy
regarding damage award requests. Second, reason-giving is an inherent
part of jury decision-making. Jurors reflect on their own evaluations of
evidence as they consider appropriate damage awards. And, jury decisions
are inevitably filled with deliberative, reason-based assessments and
judgments because jurors are required to justify their evaluations of the
evidence to other jurors during the jury deliberation. 2 ' Nonetheless, we
should keep the limitations of self-reports in mind in assessing the reasons
jurors give for their award judgments.
B. Fuzzy-Trace Theory
Fuzzy-trace theory (FTT) provides a useful framework for
understanding jurors' rationales for damage-award judgments. FTT is a
theory of memory, reasoning, and decision-making that is evidence-
based.2 2 The word "memory" is intended in the broad sense, in that it refers
17. Logan Fletcher & Peter Carruthers, Metacognition and Reasoning, 367 PHIL.
TRANSACTIONS ROYAL SOC'Y B 1366, 1366 (2012). Researchers recognize that metacognitive
research has mostly focused on metacognition of learning and remembering, rather than reasoning and
decision-making. Id. at 1366-67.
18. Haidt, The Emotional Dog and Its Rational Tail, supra note 16, at 818.
19. Id. at 815, 823.
20. See Valerie F. Reyna et al., How Fuzzy-Trace Theory Predicts True and False Memories
for Words, Sentences, and Narratives, 5 J. APPLIED RES. MEMORY & COGNITION 1, 2 (2016). Fuzzy-
trace theory distinguishes gist judgments that people are conscious of (and can articulate) from
metacognition about the underlying reasoning processes that give rise to their gist judgments. An
example of a gist judgment would be that damages in a particular case are low rather than high. For
quantifiable effects of unconscious and conscious factors in judgments, see the cognitive model by
Reyna and colleagues. Id. at 1.
21. Burd & Hans, supra note 5, at 332.
22. See Valerie F. Reyna, A New Intuitionism: Meaning, Memory, and Development in Fuzzy-
Trace Theory, 7 JUDGMENT & DECISION MAKING 332, 333 (2012).
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to the mental representation of information, either while information is
present or minutes, hours, or days after presentation. Hence, while a juror
is viewing an exhibit or recalling it days later in the jury room during
discussion of that exhibit, memory is used in both instances to store and
think about that information.
Scholars have long debated whether memory is more like a tape
recorder that reflects objective reality or a story that weaves facts together
to reflect subjective meaning and inferences that go beyond objective
facts.23 Copious and contradictory evidence seems to support both views. 24
However, FTT reconciles these contradictions by assuming there are two
types of memories that are encoded roughly simultaneously: verbatim
memory (like a tape recorder, but one that degrades and becomes
unreadable over time) and gist memory that interprets, infers, and connects
facts into stories or narratives (and degrades much more slowly).25
Thus, as jurors listen to evidence, they encode mental representations
of verbatim facts and gist interpretations in parallel. As Nancy Pennington
and Reid Hastie suggested,26 jurors construct plausible causal narratives
that account for the facts, which then inform their judgments, such as
damage-award judgments. The narratives are part of gist memories of
presented information. 27 The retrieval of verbatim versus gist memories
depends on such factors as delay from the time the information was
presented (longer delays favor gist), cues in questions (e.g., re-presenting
the information exactly cues verbatim memory), and who is doing the
remembering (e.g., younger adults are better able to remember verbatim
representations compared to older adults).28
The influential story model of Pennington and Hastie describes the
construction of stories as producing tentative predeliberation decisions.29
Many contemporary dual-process theories similarly assume a
nondeliberative or intuitive process that contrasts with a deliberative
process, but those theories assume that intuitions are thoughtless "knee-
jerk" associations rather than meaningful gist as FTT does.3 ° Both FTT
23. See Nancy Pennington & Reid Hastie, Reasoning in Explanation-Based Decision Making,
49 COGNITION 123, 123-24 (1993).
24. See Joseph W. Alba & Lynn Hasher, Is Memory Schematic?, 93 PSYCHOL. BULL. 203, 203
(1983); Marlieke T.R. van Kesteren, Dirk J. Ruiter, Guill6n Fernfndez & Richard N. Henson, How
Schema and Novelty Augment Memory Formation, 35 TRENDS IN NEUROSCIENCE 211, 211 (2012).
25. See, e.g., Reyna et al., supra note 20, at 1 2.
26. Pennington & Hastie, supra note 23.
27. Gist memory is sometimes referred to as schematic memory, although key weaknesses of
schema theories are avoided in FTT. See V.F. Reyna & C.J. Brainerd, Fuzzy-Trace Theory: An Interim
Synthesis, 7 LEARNINGi& INDIVIDUAL DIFFERENCES 1, 7 (1995).
28. See Valerie F. Reyna, Britain Mills, Steven Estrada & Charles J. Brainerd, False Memory
in Children: Data, Theory, and Legal Implications, in HANDBOOK OF EYEWITNESS PSYCHOLOGY:
MEMORY FOR EVENTS 479, 502 (Michael P. Toglia, J. Don Read, David F. Ross & R.C.L. Lindsay
eds., 2012).
29. Pennington & Hastie, supra note 23.
30. Wim De Neys, Introduction to DUAL PROCESS THEORY 2.0, at 1, 9 (Wim De Neys ed.,
2018).
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and other dual-process theories assume that people often rely on intuitive
processes in judgment and decision-making. 31 However, the legal system
rests on the foundational assumption that jurors engage in rational
deliberation.3 2 Trust in the legal system, and in juries, turns on the ability
ofjurors to rationally deliberate and to persuade other jurors using rational
arguments. 33
In FTT, gist-based judgments are intuitive whereas verbatim-based
judgments often underlie analytical deliberation-and human judgment
and decision-making typically revolve preferentially around gist.34
Research on FTT suggests that gist-based intuition supports advanced
judgment and decision-making, an alternative view of "rationality" that
differs from traditional detail-oriented analysis.35 Gist-based judgments
include ordinal judgments, such as those posited in the Hans-Reyna model
ofjury damages: once liability has been determined, jurors categorize pain
and suffering as low, medium, or high.36 One of the central tenets of that
model, grounded in FTT, is gist-verbatim independence.37 In particular,
jurors can have a firm, intuitive sense of the gist of damages, but they are
unlikely to have a firm grasp of the exact number of dollars that
corresponds to that gist.38 Nevertheless, FTT expects that gist-based
judgments form a coherent basis for dollar damage awards, and, thus, these
reasons for awards could be communicated in qualitative terms to other
31. However, there are crucial differences between FTT and other dual-process theories. See
Valerie F. Reyna, Shahin Rahimi-Golkhandan, David M.N. Garavito & Rebecca K. Helm, The Fuzzy-
Trace Dual-Process Model, in DUAL PROCESS THEORY 2.0, supra note 30, at 82; Rebecca K. Helm &
Valerie F. Reyna, Logical but Incompetent Plea Decisions: A New Approach to Plea Bargaining
Grounded in Cognitive Theory, 23 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL'Y & L. 367, 368-69 (2017); Valerie F. Reyna,
Evan A. Wilhelms, Michael J. McCormick & Rebecca B. Weldon, Development of Risky Decision
Making: Fuzzy-Trace Theory and Neurobiological Perspectives, 9 CHILD DEV. PERSPECTrVES 122,
123 (2015).
32. Jeffrey Abramson, Four Models of Jury Democracy, 90 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 861, 872-77
(2015); Shari Seidman Diamond, Jonathan D. Casper & Lynne Ostergren, Blindfolding the Jury, 52
LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 247, 247-48 (1989).
33. Nancy S. Marder & Valerie P. Hans, Introduction to Juries and Lay Participation:
American Perspectives and Global Trends, 90 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 789, 798-99 (2015).
34. Dubbed the "fuzzy-processing preference." Reyna & Brainerd, supra note 27, at 42; see
also David A. Broniatowski & Valerie F. Reyna, A Formal Model of Fuzzy-Trace Theory: Variations
on Framing Effects and the Allais Paradox, 5 DECIsION 205, 208 (2018); Valerie F. Reyna & Charles
J. Brainerd, Dual Processes in Decision Making and Developmental Neuroscience: A Fuzzy-Trace
Model, 31 DEV. REV. 180, 186 (2011).
35. Valerie F. Reyna, Farrell J. Lloyd & Charles J. Brainerd, Memory, Development, and
Rationality: An Integrative Theory of Judgment and Decision Making, in EMERGING PERSPECTIVES
ON JUDGMENT AND DECISION RESEARCH 201, 202, 212, 214-16 (Sandra L. Schneider & James
Shanteau eds., 2003); Valerie F. Reyna, When Irrational Biases Are Smart: A Fuzzy-Trace Theory of
Complex Decision Making, 6 J. INTELLIGENCE 29, 29-30 (2018) [hereinafter Reyna, When Irrational
Biases Are Smart].
36. Valerie P. Hans & Valerie F. Reyna, To Dollars from Sense: Qualitative to Quantitative
Translation in Jury Damage Awards, 8 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 120, 130 (2011).
37. Reyna & Brainerd, supra note 27, at 15-16.
38. See Valerie F. Reyna, Wendy L. Nelson, Paul K. Han & Nathan F. Dieckmann, How
Numeracy Influences Risk Comprehension and Medical Decision Making, 135 PSYCHOL. BULL. 943,
943-45 (2009) (explaining the general public's difficulty with numerical literacy and monetary
quantification).
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jurors or to judges (or, in this case, researchers).39 In sum, keeping in mind
the potential limitations of relying onjurors' post hoc reasoning about their
award decisions, this Article examines the extent to which jurors' gist-
based reasoning for damage awards matches their verbatim judgments.
II. PRESENT STUDIES
Data4" for this Article come from a larger empirical research project
designed to test a new model of damage-award decision-making. 4' The
three specific studies we draw on in the present analysis are mock juror
experiments conducted to examine how anchoring and other factors
influence juror damage awards.42 In these studies, we had 763 mock
jurors43 read a summary of one of two personal injury negligence cases. 44
Munroe v. Rumson45 involved an inattentive driver who swerved to avoid
an accident and struck an eighteen-year-old female pedestrian.46 The
plaintiff, Munroe, spent two nights in intensive care with vertebrae
injuries. She had back pain and mobility problems that completely
resolved two years after the accident. Jeansonne v. Landau47 involved a
driver who lost control of his semi-truck in a construction area and struck
an oncoming vehicle, injuring an older male. 4' The plaintiff, Jeansonne,
suffered a concussion, a fractured parietal bone, and soft tissue injury to
the cervical spine, which resulted in recurring back and neck pain that
39. Hans & Reyna, supra note 36, at 280.
40. In this Part, we discuss the stimulus materials used in this study, including the case
information participants read and information about the questions that participants answered. In this
Part, we also provide quotations from participants' descriptions of the justification for their awards.
Both the materials used in the studies and the open-ended responses are available from the Authors
upon request.
41. The research project, "Quantitative Judgments in Law: Studies of Damage Award Decision
Making," is supported by a grant from the National Science Foundation to Valerie P. Hans and Valerie
F. Reyna and has resulted in several publications.
42. The three studies varied in the specific elements they were investigating. Study 1
manipulated the size, context, and meaningfulness of numerical anchors. Valerie F. Reyna et al., The
Gist of Juries: Testing a Model of Damage Award Decision Making, 21 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL'Y & L.
280, 284 (2015) [hereinafter Reyna et al., The Gist of Juries]. Study 2 manipulated the presence, size,
and meaningfulness of a numerical anchor. Valerie P. Hans, Rebecca K. Helm & Valerie F. Reyna,
From Meaning to Money: Translating Injury into Dollars, 42 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 95, 97-98 (2018).
Study 3 manipulated the presence and meaningfulness of an anchor and also examined the influence
of the participant's numeracy. Rebecca IC Helm et al., Numeracy in the Jury Box [hereinafter Helm
et al., Numeracy in the Jury Box] (under review) (on file with authors).
43. Mock jurors were recruited from the undergraduate research participant pool. Mock jurors
were primarily female (74.2%) and white (56.7%; 15.7% Asian, 9.0% mixed ethnicity, 6.1% black,
4.7% Native American/Pacific Islander; 10.6% Hispanic/Latino) with an average age of 20.12 (SD =
2.27, range: 18-53). Eighteen participants declined to provide a reason for their award, leaving 745
participants in our analyses.
44. Although the studies varied in the specifics, all three used one or two of these cases.
45. The case description is based on the actual case of Abbinante v. O'Connell, 662 N.E.2d 126
(Ill. App. Ct. 1996). It has been used in previous research.
46. Id. at 127-28; Bradley D. McAuliff& Brian H. Bornstein, All Anchors Are Not Created
Equal: The Effects of Per Diem Versus Lump Sum Requests on Pain and Suffering Awards, 34 LAW
& HUM. BEHAV. 164, 167 (2010); Reyna et al., The Gist ofJuries, supra note 42.
47. See, e.g., Edith Greene, Michael Johns & Alison Smith, The Effects of Defendant Conduct
on Jury Damage Awards, 86 J. APPLIED PSYCHOL. 228, 229-30 (2001).
48. Id.
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never resolved. Thus, Jeansonne involved a more severe and persistent
injury than Munroe; however, in both cases, the negligent defendants did
not engage in any intentional wrongdoing.
After reading the summary, we assessed the effect of anchoring 49 by
manipulating whether the participant saw a number that was meaningful
to the case,5 ° a number that was meaningless to the case,
5 1 or no number. 52
Mock jurors were then told that the defendant had already been found
liable,53 all medical bills had been resolved, and that it was now their
responsibility to determine what dollar amount was necessary to
compensate the plaintiff for pain and suffering damages. After providing
their damage award for pain and suffering, mock jurors then provided their
reasoning for the pain and suffering award. Participants were instructed:
"Please briefly describe how you arrived at this award amount. Be specific.
For example, if there were particular aspects of the plaintiffs case, the
defendants' case, the lawyers' arguments, or the judge's instructions, that
swayed you one way or the other, please elaborate on those aspects."54
To assess the open-ended reasoning mock jurors provided for their
verdicts quantitatively, we developed a coding scheme to identify reasons
that jurors might give to justify their verdicts.55
49. See infra Section II.A.
50. The meaningful number was median income. In Study I and Study 2, we manipulated the
size of the anchor so participants either saw the median lifetime income (high anchor condition-S1.5
million) or median annual income (low anchor condition.--$50,000). In Study 3, we used only median
lifetime income ($1.5 million). The studies also varied in how the anchor was presented. Study 1
presented the anchor as a statement from the jury foreperson. Studies 2 and 3 presented the anchor as
part of the questionnaire. For example, in the high meaningful anchor condition, participants were told
that the median lifetime income was $1.5 million and were asked ifthey thought the award in this case
should be above or below this amount.
51. The meaningless number was the cost of courtroom renovations. This manipulation was
successful: a one-way analysis of variance (ANOVA) indicated that participants in the meaningful
condition rated the anchor as significantly more meaningful (M = 4.09, SD - 1.69) than participants
in the meaningless condition (M = 2.49, SD = 1.63), F(1, 343) = 79.69, MSe = 2.76,p <.001, R2 =.19.
52. In the no-anchor control condition, participants were asked to make a decision immediately.
53. We asked participants whether or not they agreed with the liability conclusion, and 91% of
participants agreed. The 9% who did not believe the defendant was liable were excluded from the
analyses unless otherwise noted, because they likely would not be providing an award in a real trial
except under certain circumstances. See infra note 62.
54. Participants answered several other questions about their perceptions of the case, the parties,
the injuries, and the legal actors, completed scales measuring numeracy and cognitive style, and
provided demographic information. See supra note 40.
55. See Table 1, infra, for the list of the twenty-one variables that were coded and their
definitions. Four trained undergraduate students coded the responses blind to the manipulations.
Overall, interrater reliability was high (Cohen's K M =.80, range: .60 (plaintiffs age) - 1.00 (judicial
instructions, legal costs)). Table 2 presents the interrater reliability measure (kappa) for each item, the
overall frequency of mentioning each item, and the frequency of mentioning based on award
categorization. Note that only participants from Study 2 and Study 3 were asked to categorize their
awards. Therefore, frequencies based on award categorization exclude participants from Study 1.
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Table 1. Open-ended coding vari
Variable
Plaintiff Factors
Injury - Bad
jy - Long
Injury - Interfering
Pain & Suffering
Plaintiffs Age
Plaintiff Responsibility
Medical Bills
Side Response Favors
Defendant Factors
Defendant Responsibility
Court Actor Factors
Plaintiffs Argument
Defense's Argument
Judge's Instructions
Anchor
Legal Bills
Mock Juror Factors
Math
Fairness
Confusion
Award Comparison
Award Classification
Other Case
able definitions,
Definition
Mentions how bad or severe the injury is.
Mentions how long the injury will last or affect the
plaintiff's life.
Mentions how much the injury interferes with the
plaintiff's life (e.g., ability to attend work or school),
Mentions pain and!or suffering of the plaintiff.
Mentions plaintiff's age as a factor in the decision.
Mentions the plaintiffs liability or responsibility (or
lack thereof) for the injury.
Mentions the plaintiff's medical costs,
Coded as favoring the defendant favoring the plaintift
or neutral (offers no explanation or discusses the merits
of both sides).
Mentions the defendant's liability or responsibility (or
lack thereof) for the injury.
Mentions the plaintiffs attorney's argument or case.
Mentions the defendant's attorney's argument or case.
Mentions the judge's instructions.
Mentions the specific number provided in the case.
Mentions the legal costs or costs of attorney.
Provides a specific mathematical equation or
calculation used.
Mentions the award being a fair, right, or accurate
amount.
Mentions being coufused, having difficulty, randomly
generating, guessing, or being unsure about the award,
Compares award amount to another number (e.g1
higher, bigger, lower, smaller, equal).
Makes a judgment about the size of the award that is
not a comparison (e.g., large, huge, small, tiny).
Compares case or award to another case.
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Table 2. Frequency of mentioning concepts based on award classification.
Award Classification
K Overall Low Medium High
N 673 69 295 66
Pflaintiff Factao
Injury- Bad
Injury - Long
injury - Interering
Pain & Suffering
Plaintiffs Age
Plaintiff Responsibility
Medical Bills
Response Favor Plaintiff
Response NeutraI
Defendant Factors
Response Favor Defendant
Dekfndant Responsibility
Court Actor Factors
Plaintiffs Argument
Dcfense's Argument
Judge's Instructions
Anchor
Legal Bills
.72 11.1% 12.5% 10.8% 7.6%
.85 41.5% 37.7% 40.3% 31.8%
.81 46.7% 333%1 46.8%4 4 8.5%b
.88 44.3% 42.0% 40.7% 47.0%
.60 11.6% 15.9% 9.5% 9.1%
.88 3.6% 5.8% 4-1% 4.5%
.99 26.3% 24.6% 23.1% 27.3%
.69 45.6% 20.3%c 42.0% 57.6%
.69 51.0% 72.5%J 54 .9%d 40.9%
.69 3.4% 7.2% 3.1% 1.5%
.92 38.0% 53.6% ,f  35-3%' 28.8%T
.83 9.1% 7.2% 7.1% 10.6%
.83 7.1% 7.2% 7.8% 4.5%
1.00 3.3% 1.4% 2.7% 3.0%
.78 8.0% 5.7% 10.2% 9.1%
1.00 0.3% 0% 0.3% 1.5%
Mack Juror Factors
Math .93 9.7% 5.8% 9.2% 9.1%
Fairnss .82 13.4% L.6% 13-2% 9.1%
cnfision .66 13.4% 13.0% 16.3% 21-2%
Award Comparison .72 9.2% 15.9% 10.5% 6.0%
Award Classification .67 7.8%, 0%; 4 .7%1 10.6%0
Other Case, .81 2.1% 0% 3.9% 4.8%
Note: Only participants who agreed the defendant was liable are inclded. Inerter
reliabili is measured based on Cohen's kappa (K). Percentages indicate pemem of
mock jurors who metioned the concept, Percentages of nck jurors broken down
by award categorization do not iclude partipants from Study 1. Variables that
share the same superscript are mentioned at significantly diffetnt rates based on
award classificationp < .05
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We then assessed the relationship among the coded reasons and the
other variables we measured.5 6 Next, we determined which reasons predict
damage awards by putting all of the coded reasons into a multiple
regression along with the specific study, the particular negligence case,
and the presence and meaning of the anchor.57 Controlling for all other
variables, mention of the degree to which the injury interfered with the
plaintiffs life, mention of the anchor, and the side the response favored
significantly predicted damage awards.5 8
Table 3. Correlations among variables.
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
I Study 1.00
2 Mcaning -.01 1.00
3 Liability '01 03 U0
4 Award(In) .12" ,12** -.20*t 1.00
5 Award Confidence -.07 .06 -.03 .09* 1,00
6 AwardCatcgorization .03 .09* -213* .S** .19** 1.00
7 InjuryBad .02 -.02 -.02 .02 .01 -.08 1.00
8 IjuryLong - .09*.03 .14- .07 .05 .01 .12" 1.00
9 Injury Interfering -,0s* ,08 -14"* 11** .12** .14" .02 ,19** 1.00
10 Pain& Suffering -.04 .00 -,10" .02 .07 .03 .13** .19** .06 1.00
I1 Plaintiffs Age -.04 .02 -.06 .05 -.01 -.04 .02 12"* .07* 11**
12 Plaintiff Responsiliity .05 .09* .02 .02 .00 .02 -.05 -.04 -.04 04
13 Medical Bins -.01 .04 -.02 -.03 -.01 -.02 -.01 ,10* 13* .05
14 Side Response Pavors -.12** -.02 .21** .3 *  .12** 32** -.06 .10* .23* .10"'
15 Defendat Responsibility .00 .01 ,10" -,09* .06 1s" .04 -.0 -i0** .03
16 Phintiff'rs Argument -.03 .06 -.01 .06 -.01 .03 -.03 05 -.,09 .07
17 Defense'sArgumnl .01 .05 .05 -.04 .01 -.06 -.03 -.02 -.01 .06
18 Judges Insthru as -.04 .05 .02 .00 -.03 .04 .03 -.03 .03 .05
19 Anchor .02 20"* -.03 12** -.07 .06 -.06 -.02 -.04 .06
20 Legal Bils .05 -.00 -.02 .05 .06 6 -.02 .01 .01 .01
21 Math -.04 .05 -.05 .07 -.01 .07 -.01 .11- .06 .01
22 Fairness -.05 .05 -.04 -.01 -.03 -.03 -.06 -.06 -.06 .03
23 Confusion .17* -.02 -.0r .04 -.05 .10t -.07 -.0 -.05 .00.
24 Award Compaison, .01 .04 -.03 0 -04 .01 -.04 -.0W -,0 -.00
25 Award Classification -16" .04 .07 -.02 .05 .08 -.02 -.04 -.01 -.01
26 OtherCase 14*t .07 -.01 .05 .07 .08 -.02 .03 -.00 -.02
56. See Table 3, infra, for correlations.
57. Because damage awards are not normally distributed, the dependent variable was the natural
log of the damage awards rather than the raw damage awards. This procedure is commonly used with
non-normally distributed data so as not to violate the assumptions of the statistical test. See, e.g., Helm
et al., Numeracy in the Jury Box, supra note 42. The model significantly predicted damage awards,
F(23, 602) = 4.62, p < .001, R2 =. 12. See infra Table 4.
58. See infra Table 4. Again, these were natural log damage awards. Study and case were also
significant predictors. Results are discussed in more detail below.
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Table 3. Continued.
11 Plainrits Age
12 PlffRsponsity
13 Medkal~illI
14 Sid, R oipr Favors
15 DcfenIdntRcapnshility
16 Plaitiffs Argument
17 ns's Argument
10 Edg 'slntruran
19 Anchor
20 LgalBills
21 Math
22 Faim
23 Confusion
24 Award mparison
25 Award Classificiiiion
26 Othr Can
21 Math
22 Faims
23 Confusion
24 Awad Comprison
25 Award Classification
26 OthcrCase
Notc: *p <.05; ** < ,
11 12 13 14 15 16 17 1 19 20
1.00
-.02 1.00
.05 .00 L00
.06 -.01 .00* 1.00
-.02 0p -.01 -,17" 1.00
.01 .04 .04 .17* '10" 1.00
-.07 AP -.04 -.13*' ,22** .1** 1.00
.01 .00 .01 .01 -.03 13" 09* 1.00
-.00 .01 -.,06 .00 -.05 -.04 .00 .02 1.00
-.02 -.01 -.03 .01 -.04 -.02 -.02 -.01 -.01 1.00
.13** -.06 .05 ,11" -jo" -.02 -.06 .07 .07' ,07'
.06 -.03 -.02 -.01 -.07' -.02 -.06 .04 ,06 .14"*
-.02 -.01 -.k6 -.* -.05 .01 .02 .04 ,09* .06
-.02 .01 -.04 .08' -.03 .03 .01 .01 ,13-' ,op
-02 -.00 -.03 -. 03 .1** .04 .09' .03 .00 -.01
,0 -.03 -.06 -.0' -.08 -.01 -.00 .00' .09' -.01
21 22 23 24 25 26
1.00
.00 1.00
.01 .02 1.00
- .02 .02 ,11*" 1.00
-.07 .04 -.0 .05 1.00
.06 Z0 .19* .05 -. 04 1,00
854 DENVER LAWREVIEW [Vol. 96:4
Table 4. Multiple regession analysis of open-ended responses on natural log damage
awards.
B S.E. t p
Constant 7.74 .43
Study 39 .12 336 .00
Case 1.01 -23 4.45 .00
Anchor Meaning 30 .13 239 .03
Plain iffactors
Injury- Bad AS .32 lAS .14
Injury - Long .15 .21 .70 .48
Injury - Interfering A8 .22 2.24 .03
Pain& Suffering -.12 .21 -.60 .55
Plaintiffs Age .05 31 .16 .87
Plaintiff Responsibility _28 .54 .52 .60
Medical Bills -.42 .23 -1.83 .07
Response Favorability .97 .19 5.08 .00
Def ,ant Factors
Defendant Responsibility -.20 .21 -.93 36
Court Actor Factors
Plaintiff s Argument -.08 .35 -.24 .81
Defene's Argument .51 .39 1.32 .19
Judge's Instructions -.54 .54 -1.01 31
Anchor .64 .30 2.10 .04
Legal Bills 1.82 1.75 1-04 30
Mock Juror Factors
Math .11 .33 33 .75
Fairness -.10 .28 -35 .73
Confusion -.02 -30 .01 .99
Award Comparison -.08 -33 -25 .80
Award Classification -29 -36 -_79 .43
Other Case 1.03 -71 145 .15
Note: Only participants who agreed the defendant was liable were included i the
model All vaiables are dichotomous (no mentiontmention), with higher values
indicating mentioning item, except response favorability (defense, neutal
plaintiff), with higher values indicating more plaintiff favorabilty. Beta weight
and standard error are uistandardized_ Bolded items are statistically significant (p
< .05).
In the following Sections, we discuss each of the reason categories
by providing examples of responses that exemplify the category and
quantitative data on how the mentioning of that reason relates to damage
awards and other determinations. Specifically, we separate results by case
(less severe, more severe) and the participants' categorization of their
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awards as low, medium, or high. We have divided this Part into four
themes, based on the party most related to the reason category, including
the plaintiff, the defendants, the court actors, and the mock juror.
A. Plaintiff
Perhaps unsurprisingly, the majority of responses and categories of
reasons coded included discussions of the plaintiff.59 Overall, 43.4% of
responses favored the plaintiff. The two most mentioned reason categories
across all studies were how much the injury interfered with the plaintiffs
life (mentioned by 46.7% of mock jurors) and how much pain and
suffering the plaintiff experienced (mentioned by 44.3% of mock jurors). 60
Other plaintiff elements were mentioned from 3.6% to 44.3% of the time. 
61
The majority of mock jurors (75.8%) included at least some consideration
of the plaintiff's injury in their responses.62
Although factors related to the plaintiff were the most mentioned,
only plaintiff favorability and injury interference were related to the given
award.63 Responses favoring the plaintiff were associated with higher
damage awards than neutral responses or responses favoring the
defendant.64 Moreover, mock jurors who mentioned the injury interfering
with the plaintiff's life ("injury interfering") gave higher damage awards
than mock jurors who did not. 65 There were differences between cases
though, with mock jurors mentioning injury interference significantly
more in the Munroe case than the Jeansonne case. 66 Interestingly, while
mentioning injury interference was associated with the decision that the
mock jurors reached, mentioning pain and suffering was not. 67 Therefore,
it appears that mock jurors are paying more attention to the gist of injury
59. Reason codes for plaintiff-related variables include mentioning how bad the injury was,
how long the injury lasted, how interfering the injury was, pain and suffering, medical bills, plaintiffs
age, and plaintiffs responsibility. See Table 2, supra, for percent of mock jurors who mentioned each
variable and the interrater reliability scores.
60. The number 42.6% is a high rate for spontaneously mentioning a concept; however, it is
important to note that people are being told the one thing they are meant to consider is how much pain
and suffering the plaintiff experienced. See supra Table 2. Therefore, it is somewhat concerning from
a legal perspective that fewer than half of the mock jurors mention pain and suffering.
61. See supra Table 2.
62. There were four codes that focused on the injury-bad, long, interfering, and pain and
suffering. Looking at mentions of these variables combined, on average participants mentioned 1.38
factors related to the injury (31.7% mentioned 1; 29.0% mentioned 2; 12.8% mentioned 3; 2.4%
mentioned all 4). However, 24.2% of responses included no mention of the injury. See id.
63. See supra Table 4; see also supra Table 3.
64. For every 1 -point increase in favorability, natural log awards increased by .97, t = 5.08, p <
.001. See supra Table 4.
65. Mock jurors who mentioned interference gave natural log awards that were .48 higher than
mockjurors who did not, t = 2.24, p = .03. See supra Table 4.
66. Mock jurors were significantly more likely to mention interference in Munroe (56.1%) than
Jeansonne (31.3%), X2(1) = 43.46, p < .001. This is most likely due to the Munroe case facts
highlighting the interference of the injury more, even though Munroe involves an injury of shorter
duration overall. See supra note 40.
67. See supra Table 4; see also supra Table 3.
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(how interfering it is) than the verbatim legal concept (pain and suffering)
when determining their award.
In concert with this view, as shown in Table 2, mock jurors frequently
articulated reasons for their judgments that included a categorization of
the award or a comparison of their award amount to another number.6 a
Other qualitative-gist categories such as whether injuries were long lasting
or interfering, along with "fuzzy" intangibles such as pain and suffering,
were articulated by over 40% of mock jurors.69 Consistent with the Hans-
Reyna model,7 ° responses favoring the plaintiff increased more than 37%
as judgments progressed in perceived magnitude from low, to medium, to
high.7
1
Many participants struggled with placing a monetary value on pain
and suffering. Some participants determined a monthly or yearly amount,72
others based it on the cost of tuition73 or income, 74 while others determined
that pain and suffering was priceless.75 Mock jurors who referred to pain
and suffering being incalculable often discussed the consequences of the
accident being terrible but noncompensable, leading them to award low
damages. For example, one mock juror justified:
I think I chose $1000 because it is a substantial sum of money that
doesn't break the bank. I lean towards a lower sum of money because
I am not convinced that pain and suffering can ever have a dollar
price, especially when it was caused on accident. [Everyone] is dealt
a different hand in life. I'm not convinced that people should be
compensated for bad luck.76
Similarly, a second mock juror explained:
68. In other words, participants would either say their award was large (award classification) or
say it was more than another number, such as college tuition (award comparison). See supra Table 2
("Award Classification" and "Award Comparison"); see also Table 1, supra, for definitions.
69. See supra Table 2.
70. Hans & Reyna, supra note 36, at 129-30.
71. See supra Table 2. It is worth noting that overall, gist interpretations of the information
about the case elicited more comments than attorneys' arguments or the judge's instructions. See infra
Section II.C.
72. The exact amount varied, though. For example, two participants said pain and suffering is
$200/month while two other participants said it is $1,000/year. See supra note 40.
73. Eleven participants based their calculation on some portion of college/community college
tuition, understandable given the participant pools were composed of current college students. See
supra note 40.
74. Thirty participants based it on income. However, it is important to note that income
measures were used as anchor numbers. See supra note 40.
75. Over ten participants concluded there was no amount that could make up for what the
plaintiff lost. See supra note 40.
76. Krystia Reed, Valerie P. Hans & Valerie F. Reyna, Study 2 [hereinafter Study 2]
(unpublished transcript) (on file with authors).
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It is unfair to punish Mr. Rumson through monetary means when it
would not achieve what it is supposed to: truly compensating for
Rebecca's lost time.
77
And a third mock juror concluded:
Emotional pain sucks but you can't put a price on it. It sucks what
happened to her, but giving her money now isn't going to make it any
better. It will just make his life worse. She is better [now]. Move on
with life.
78
While a fourth one summarized the sentiment stating:
Money will not erase "pain and suffering."79
B. Defendant
In the two cases employed in these three mock juror experiments,
mock jurors were told that the defendant had been found legally
responsible, and their task was solely to determine a damage award.
Therefore, only 3.4% of the reasoning responses favored the defendant."8
These responses were distinctive, however. Mock jurors who favored the
defendant were 1.96 times more likely to disagree with the conclusion that
the defendant was liable. 81 Moreover, mock jurors whose reasons favored
the defendant gave lower damage awards.82
The only substantive reason that was primarily linked to the
defendant was defendant responsibility. Overall, 39.5% of mock jurors
discussed the defendant's responsibility. 83 However, mentioning the
defendant's responsibility was related to less agreement that the defendant
was liable.8 4 It was also associated with lower award categorizations.
85
77. Krystia Reed, Valerie P. Hans & Valerie F. Reyna, Study 1 [hereinafter Study 1]
(unpublished transcript) (on file with authors).
78. Krystia Reed, Valerie P. Hans & Valerie F. Reyna, Study 3 [hereinafter Study 3]
(unpublished transcript) (on file with authors).
79. Study 1, supra note 77.
80. See supra Table 2.
81. Although mock jurors were told that the defendant was liable, we also asked them whether
or not they agreed with this conclusion. Overall, 91% of mock jurors agreed that the defendant was
liable. Mock jurors who provided justifications favoring the defendant were significantly more likely
to say the defendant was not liable (36.1%) than participants who were neutral (10.4%) or favored the
plaintiff(4.10%), X2(2) = 43.10, p < .001. See supra note 40.
82. Mock jurors who gave responses favoring the defendant had natural log damage awards
that were .97 lower than the awards given by mock jurors whose responses were neutral, t = 5.08, p <
.001. See supra Table 4.
83. See supra Table 2.
84. Mock jurors who mentioned the defendant's responsibility were significantly more likely
to disagree with the liability judgment against the defendant (12.3%) than mock jurors who did not
mention the defendant's responsibility (6.7%), X 2( 1) 6.85, p < .01. See supra note 40.
85. X2(2) = 10.44, p < 01. See supra Table 2. There were no differences in the natural log
damage awards when focusing on only participants who agreed the defendant was liable. See supra
Table 4. Across all participants, though, mentioning defendant responsibility was negatively correlated
with natural log damage awards, r = -.09, p = .01. This is interesting to note because in civil cases,
liability determinations do not have to be unanimous, and in some cases the jury is told the defendant
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Mock jurors who mentioned defendant responsibility were significantly
more likely to classify the award as low (53.6%) than medium (35.3%) or
high (28.8%).86 This is likely because most mock jurors who discussed the
defendant's responsibility focused on the accidental nature of the event.
For example, one mock juror reasoned:
The most compelling aspect about Rumson which guides me not to
award her an excessive amount is that he was trying to [avoid] another
accident when he hit Rebecca. He was quick to admit his faults, had
his insurance pay for all her illnesses as proper, and he obviously did
not hit her on purpose.
87
Another juror stated:
Mr. Rumson needs to pay because he [is] the one who caused these
medical issues, however it was stressed that his actions were
unintentional. Because he did not intentionally hurt her, this should be
taken into account when deciding how much he should pay her.
88
Nevertheless, there were some exceptions, such as the mock juror
who stated:
I [thought] the defendant tried to claim as little responsibility as
possible, which turned me offfrom [his] argument and made me want
to charge him more.
89
These sentiments indicate the importance of how the defendant is
perceived in juror damage award calculations. Defendants who are
perceived more favorably often have to pay less, while defendants who are
perceived less favorably have to pay more.9° This occurs even when the
injury is the same and no punitive damages are requested.
Participants' comments on an absence of intentionality would be
understandable if they were asked to determine liability, because a key
element of judgments of legal responsibility is the intention of the
perpetrator. 9' However, the defendant's level of responsibility is legally
irrelevant in damage award determinations. 92 This surprising focus on
defendant's responsibility in reasons mock jurors provided in these studies
is liable and they are only responsible for determining damages (such as was done in these studies).
Therefore, it is possible that jurors who do not agree with the liability determination will drag down
average damage awards in these cases.
86. See supra Table 2.
87. Study 1, supra note 77.
88. Study 3, supra note 78.
89. Study 1, supra note 77.
90. See supra Table 2.
91. JENNIFER K. ROBBENNOLT & VALERIE P. HANS, THE PSYCHOLOGY OF TORT LAW 26-29
(2016).
92. See EMILY SHERWIN & SAMUEL L. BRAY, AMES, CHAFEE AND RE ON REMEDIES: CASES
AND MATERIALS 181 (2d ed. 2018).
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suggests the influence of the phenomenon of fusion.93 That is, jurors are
supposed to determine liability and then determine damages. Because
contributory negligence was not at issue in these cases, 94 once participants
knew that liability had been determined, the plaintiff should have received
an amount that compensated the entire injury. Unless punitive damages
are involved, the effect of the damages on the defendant should not be
considered.9 5 Therefore, because the defendant was completely at fault, he
is legally responsible for compensating the plaintiff for all her injuries. 96
The fact that the incident was a result of a negligently-caused accident and
not intentional behavior should legally only influence initial
determinations about liability (and potentially punitive damages), not
compensatory damages.
97
Nonetheless, researchers have documented the occurrence of fusion
in juror responses to liability and award judgments in civil cases. 98
Judgments about liability can also influence award decisions: A defendant
whose actions are reprehensible may wind up paying more in damages
than a sympathetic but negligent defendant for the same injury. The
reasoning responses here indicate that jurors might not be behaving
consistently with the law. 99 Instead, a substantial number indicate they are
regularly considering the defendant's responsibility not just for liability
determinations but also as part of the damage award determination.
C. Court Actors
Overall, participants did not mention the court actors (attorneys and
the judge) very frequently.'0 0 Nor did mention of the court actors predict
damage award amounts.'0 ' The attorneys' arguments and judge's
instructions did stand out for some mock jurors, though. Although some
mock jurors mentioned the plaintiffs attorney's argument, jurors only
directly referred to the defense attorney or the judge, not the plaintiff's
93. ROBBENNOLT & HANS, supra note 91, at 153-57 (describing research on holistic justice and
double-discounting).
94. Contributory negligence was not at issue here. The plaintiff did not do anything to
contribute to the injury. Mock jurors recognized this as only 3.6% mentioned the plaintiff's
responsibility, while 39.5% discussed the defendant's responsibility. Moreover, participants who
discussed the plaintiffs responsibility often focused on the event being an accident, or the plaintiff
being "in the wrong place at the wrong time." See supra note 40.
95. See SHERWIN & BRAY, supra note 92.
96. Id.
97. !d.
98. ROBBENNOLT & HANS, supra note 91, at 157-58.
99. This could potentially be a form ofjury nullification. See infra Section llI.A.
100. See Table 2, supra, for frequencies. The cases were limited in content though, so it is
possible that more focus would be paid to the court actors if they were more involved in the case.
101. There were no differences in natural log damage awards based on mentioning the plaintiff s
attorney, the defense attorney, or the judge. See supra Table 4. However, other research demonstrates
that perceptions of the attorneys can influence verdicts. See, e.g., Krystia Reed, Calls for Speculation:
An Experimental Examination of Juror Perceptions of Attorney Objections, BUFF. L. REV.
(forthcoming 2019) (manuscript at 11-15) (on file with authors).
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attorney. For example, one mock juror balanced the defense attorney's
argument against the judge's instructions:
It is difficult to assign a monetary value to pain and suffering in this
case, as price tags cannot be easily attached to things like missed
soccer games and missed high school events. That being said, I would
award $100, 000 to Ms. Munroe for her pain [and] suffering. While the
defense attorney asserted that his client's culpability should be
reduced because Ms. Munroe was merely in the wrong place at the
wrong time when Mr. Rumson swerved onto the sidewalk to avoid a
car accident, the judge made clear in [his] instructions that this award
is not about punishing Mr. Rumson.
10 2
Another mock juror considered the defense attorney's argument,
stating:
If not for avoiding this accident, the defendant could have caused a
more serious accident. However, the defendant still caused this, and
[the] plaintiff should be compensated. However, as the defendant's
lawyer's closing [argument] stated, it should not be excessive. The
defendant did not act with intent or complete carelessness, and he
should not have to be held liable for paying high costs .... 103
Not all mock jurors viewed the defense attorney's argument
positively, though. For example, one mock juror stated:
Also, the closing argument by the defendant's lawyer did not seem
genuine. J agree money cannot compensate for all of Rebecca 's
suffering; however, it should cover her medical bills, [physical]
therapy bills, and some extra money should be awarded for her being
unable to participate and do the things she loves.
104
Another factor potentially relevant to court actors is the anchor,
which can be brought up in many different ways. 05 Consistent with
previous research, the anchor significantly impacted mock jurors, such
that jurors in the high-anchor conditions provided higher damage awards
than jurors in the control condition. '0 6 Jurors do not necessarily recognize
102. Study 1, supra note 77.
103. Study 2, supra note 76.
104. Id.
105. In these studies, the anchor was either provided by the jury foreperson (Study 1) or in the
questionnaire (Study 2 and Study 3). However, attorneys can also be the source of the anchor, such as
in their closing arguments.
106. A general linear model using anchor meaning as the independent variable and natural log
damage awards as the dependent variable indicated there was a significant main effect of anchor
meaning, F(2, 686) = 10.74, MSe - 6.25, p <.001, R 2 = .03. Natural log damage awards in the control
condition were significantly lower (M = 10.24, SE = .17) than in the meaningless (M = 11.26, SE =
.16, p < .001) or meaningful (M = 11.10, SE .16, p < .001) conditions. There were no differences in
damages between the meaningless and meaningful conditions (p = .51). See supra note 40.
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the anchor is important to them, however. °7 Overall, only 8% of mock
jurors mentioned the anchor. 108 For example, one mock juror who
participated in a study that manipulated the anchor number through a
foreman's statement wrote:
I disagree with the jury foreman in that I do not believe the award
should be based on the perceived upper limit of what the plaintiff
would have earned had she been [employed] during the period of her
injury. 109
Other mock jurors found that the anchor was instructive, such as the
mock juror who explained:
As I do not have any experience with the amount of money typically
awarded in these cases, I was swayed by the jury foreman 's suggested
amount.
110
Mentioning the anchor was related to higher damage awards. "' There
were no differences in mention of the anchor depending on who provided
it;" 2 however, meaning of the anchor did make a difference. The anchor
was mentioned more frequently when it was meaningful than when it was
meaningless. 3 Therefore, jurors seem to be affected by the anchor more
than they admit but are more likely to admit they are influenced by the
anchor when it is relevant to the case.
D. Juror
In addition to characteristics of the trial actors, there were several
characteristics of the individual mock jurors that they said influenced their
decisions. Specifically, responses sometimes included concerns about
fairness, expressions of confusion, math equations, and classification of
the award. However, none of these characteristics predicted damage
awards." 14
Many of the jurors were concerned with fairness; 13% of mock jurors
expressed the sentiment that the award they were giving was the "fair,"
107. This is consistent with the anchoring and adjusting heuristic. See Tversky & Kahneman,
supra note 9, at 1128.
108. See K = .78. See supra Table 2.
109. Study 1, supra note 77.
110. Id.
111. Mentioning the anchor resulted in natural log damage awards that were .64 higher. See
supra Table 4.
112. When the foreperson provided the anchor, 5% of participants mentioned it; when the anchor
was provided in a question posed to the participants, 8.5% of participants mentioned it, X2(1) = 1.69,
p = .26. See supra note 40.
113. No participants mentioned the anchor in the control condition, 9% mentioned the anchor in
the meaningless condition, and 14.5% mentioned the anchor in the meaningful condition, X2(2)
26.07, p < .001. See supra note 40.
114. See supra Table 4.
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"just," or "right" award." 5 Fairness cut both ways, though.116 Some
participants focused on being fair toward the plaintiff, such as the mock
juror who explained:
I believe this is a fair amount for the plaintiff's pain and suffering
based on the facts of the case. Although it is difficult to put a number
to label "pain and suffering" it is a little less than the court
[renovation] costs.117
Other mock jurors focused on fairness toward the defendant, such as
the mock juror who stated:
I think it is unfair to excessively punish a man for a mistake that is now
[corrected]." 8 1
Perhaps unsurprisingly, concerns about fairness were sometimes
coupled with expressions of confusion about the award.'19 For example,
one mock juror explained:
I wasn 't given any background on how much is typically given for
emotional pain/suffering so I didn 't have any idea where to start from
- didn't know what was reasonable. I was told average annual income
is 50, 000 and I thought her emotional suffering was pretty tremendous
so I awarded her 20% of this number. I also was considering the
average income because I didn 't want to be too unfair in what I made
the defendant pay.120
Some jurors turned to math or numerical comparisons to justify their
awards. Nearly 10% of mock jurors used a mathematical equation to
justify their award. 121 For example, one juror explained:
I used a rough estimate of about $50 a day for 2 years, which came
out to $36500. I chose $50 a day since this is in the range of how much
a high schooler might make on any given work day at their part-time
job (I am assuming the plaintiff was very [committed] to soccer and
her other activities requiring physical mobility, similar to the amount
of time put into a part-time job). While a part-time job may only be on
afew days in a week, the plaintiff suffered more since she missed out
on normal activities [that] she could have participated in had she not
115. These concepts were coded as "fairness." See supra Table 2.
116. This is potentially why there is no significant impact on damage awards, because the
dichotomous coding did not fully capture which side the mock juror was considering when thinking
about fairness. Thus, this distinction might be captured better in the assessments of response
favorability, which did significantly predict awards.
117. Study 3, supra note 78.
118. Study 1, supra note 77.
119. Overall, 13.4% of participants indicated some degree of confusion. See supra Table 2.
120. Study 2, supra note 76.
121. Overall, 9.7% of participants described a math formula. See supra Table 2.
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been hit by the defendant. For this, I added an extra $15000 or so, just
for a nice even-looking number.122
Others attempted to characterize their award as large or small, 1 23 or
compare their award to some other number. 124 For example, one mock
juror explained:
I think the defendant should definitely bepunished and [made] to pay
the plaintiff a medium to high amount. I came to this conclusion
because the accident seems to have been the defendant's fault. He
should have pumped the brakes, which he should know as a
professional truck driver. But because he did not, he lost control and
the accident occurred. While I concluded the amount should be
medium to high, I was not sure at all what would constitute a
"medium" or "high" amount.
125
These comments underline that the jurors understand the gist of the
injury and can categorize the award amount accordingly. It is assigning a
verbatim dollar award amount to the injury that many mock jurors found
to be difficult.
III. IMPLICATIONS
A. Summary and Caveats
This Article aimed to shed light on the reasons behind jury damage
awards. When asked to provide the reasons that led them to a specific
dollar damage award amount, our study participants reported considering
a variety of factors when reaching their decisions. 126 Interestingly, the
factors varied across participants; there was no factor that even 50% of the
mock jurors reported considering. 127
Ultimately, the only factors that related to damage awards were
mentioning how interfering the injury was, mentioning the anchor, and the
side the response favored.'2 8 Most responses tended to favor the plaintiff
and included comments about injury interference (which predicted
damage awards) or pain and suffering (which they were specifically told
to consider, but did not predict damage awards). Fewer responses favored
the defendant, but those that did were associated with lower damage
awards. 2 9 Defendant responsibility was often mentioned as a reason to
122. Study 3, supra note 78.
123. Overall, 7.8% of participants characterized their award as small, medium, or large when
they provided an account of how they arrived at their damage award. See supra Table 2.
124. Overall, 9.2% of participants compared their award to some other number, including the
anchor. Id.
125. Study 3, supra note 78.
126. See supra Table 2.
127. Id. The highest mentioned factor was mentioned by 46.1% of participants.
128. See supra Table 4.
129. See supra Section II.B.
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reduce damage awards to prevent a perceived harm to the defendant. '30
Additionally, mock jurors recognized they were influenced by the anchor
to some extent, particularly when the anchor was relevant or meaningful
to the case, but mock jurors seemed to underestimate the extent to which
the anchor influenced them.' 31
It is important to note the limitations to these findings. First, the
materials used were limited in content. It is possible that results would be
different in a longer, more detailed trial. For example, in a real trial, more
attention might be paid to the attorneys because they are presenting the
case to the jury. Moreover, these were negligence cases that involved no
intentional wrongdoing by the defendant. What jurors find important is
likely to vary based on the type of case and facts involved.
Second, as we discussed earlier, there are limits to our metacognitive
abilities.'32 Research in psychology suggests that we are sometimes
challenged in generating reasons for our judgments and decisions after the
fact. 133
Third, we studied individual mock jurors' reasons for their damage
awards rather than examining the reason-giving process during jury
deliberations. Although it is possible that these factors mirror what the
mock jurors would have said if they were in deliberation, it is not certain.
Mock jurors provided anonymous, written justifications of their responses
to a researcher. It is possible jurors would say something different when
orally justifying their position in person to other jurors.
B. Consequences for Trial Attorneys and the Legal System
The law is based on an idealized notion that fact-finding is driven by
logic and rationality. Fact finders are expected to follow a logical pattern
and provide reasons for their decisions-judges in their written opinions
and jurors in their deliberations with other jurors. 3 4 However, all fact
finders are potentially subject to human biases.'35 The intuitive-override
model ofjudging posits that trained judges are not purely rational actors. '36
Instead, judges tend to make intuitive decisions based on human biases but
can override their intuitions with complex, deliberative thought. 13 Indeed,
130. See supra Section ll.B.
131. See supra Section lI.C.
132. See supra Section l.A.
133. See supra Section 1.A.
134. See Burd & Hans, supra note 5, at 321.
135. See Chris Guthrie, Jeffrey J. Rachlinski & Andrew J. Wistrich, Blinking on the Bench: How
Judges Decide Cases, 93 CORNELL L. REv. 1, 5 (2007).
136. Id. at 6. Some research suggests that the intuitive-override model is neither descriptively
true nor necessarily desirable. See Reyna, When Irrational Biases Are Smart, supra note 35, at 36.
FTr offers advantages to traditional dual process models in explaining how these decisions are being
made.
137. Guthrie et al., supra note 135, at 13.
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research on FTT has shown that cognitive biases can be larger in experts
than laypersons.
Jurors similarly do not fit the pristine ideal of the rational actor,
influenced solely by logic and facts. In our studies, mock jurors were asked
to give a dollar damage award for the plaintiffs pain and suffering in the
case, but fewer than half of them specifically mentioned verbatim the
words "pain and suffering" in their explanations of how they arrived at
those dollar awards.' 3 8 In fact, a quarter of our participants made no
mention of the injury at all.'3 9 Although considering interference of the
injury was related to pain and suffering awards, mentioning pain and
suffering or other characteristics of the injury was not. '4 0
Instead, jurors seem to be operating at the gist level and some appear
to be affected (consciously or not) by concepts that should be, as a strict
legal matter, irrelevant. One of the primary factors related to awards was
the side the mock juror's reasoning response favored, suggesting that
jurors have a fuzzy idea of who they want to support, which is then
translated into damage awards. Moreover, at this point in the trial, mock
jurors should not be considering defendant responsibility because liability
has already been determined. Yet, many mock jurors were concerned
about the award not being too harsh for the defendant because the event
was an accident, resulting in reduced damage awards. 4 ' Legally, though,
the defendant is responsible and the plaintiff deserves to be compensated
for the entire injury caused by the defendant's negligence.'4 2 Consistent
with the research on both FTT '43 and moral judgments, " jurors went with
their gist interpretation and not the law; apparently resulting in some
discounting of the award.145 Discounting in this instance might be
considered a mild form of civil jury nullification. 146 Rather than following
138. See supra Table 2.
139. See supra note 62 (showing that 24.2% made no mention of the injury in offering reasons
for their award judgments).
140. See supra Table 1.
141. See supra Section 1I.B.
142. These cases did not involve punitive damages, just compensatory damages for the plaintiff' s
injuries with no issue of contributory negligence. Therefore, once liability is determined, the plaintiff
should be compensated entirely. The consequence of the award on the defendant should not be
considered. See supra text accompanying notes 90-99.
143. See supra Section I.B. This is a gist judgment of who deserves money (the defendant or the
plaintiff), rather than focusing on the verbatim instructions of the law.
144. See supra Section I.A. Similar to Haidt's proposition, jurors seem to make an intuitive
judgment about what should be the fair, moral, and just outcome and then match the award to the
judgment. See Haidt, The Emotional Dog and Its Rational Tail, supra note 16. Even when justifying
their moral decisions, jurors appear to be relying on their intuition about what is fair or right, rather
than focusing specifically on the law.
145. As noted above, those who mentioned the defendant's responsibility appeared to have
discounted the award to the plaintiff, a phenomenon that has been found in other jury studies. See
ROBBENNOLT & HANS, supra note 91, at 155-57. It is also possible that jurors discounted their
perceptions of injury severity.
146. Jury "[n]ullification occurs when a jury-based on its own sense of justice or fairness--
refuses to follow the law and convict in a particular case even though the facts seem to allow no other
conclusion but guilt." Jack B. Weinstein, Considering Jury "Nullification ": When May and Should a
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the letter of the law, requiring full compensation to the plaintiff, jurors
consider their own senses of fairness and morality to prevent a perceived
injustice to the negligent defendant.
Another factor that influenced mock jurors was the anchor. Our
research studies varied the presence and size of anchor numbers. However,
only a handful of mock jurors explicitly reported relying on the
meaningless anchor, suggesting that whatever effect it has is occurring
mainly at an unconscious level. Mock jurors in the meaningful anchor
condition were more likely to report using it, likely because they
considered it relevant and, therefore, something they should consider.
These results indicate that the intuitive principle of judging seems to
apply to jurors as well. It appears that jurors develop an overall intuition
or gist about the severity of an injury, the culpability of the parties, and the
general classification (size) of the award. This gist is likely to be informed
by the legal context but can be influenced by extralegal factors as well.
Moreover, jurors struggle with the verbatim judgment-turning the gist
into a dollar award judgment.
We conclude that, when asked to provide a damage award amount,
jurors rely on an overall gist assessment of the injury in context. Some of
the elements that appear to be most relevant are consistent with the law's
strictures. Other elements of the context may go outside the law's limits.
Attorneys on both sides would benefit from considering the full
context of an injury to help jurors appreciate the gist of the relevant facts.
That gist should capture, ideally, a deeper truth that goes beyond
superficial facts-and lawyers could help jurors achieve that kind of
meaningful insight into the facts. Thus, successful attorneys should see
part of their task as helping jurors understand the gist of the injury. For a
plaintiffs attorney, this might mean developing a picture of a sympathetic
plaintiff, explaining how much the injury has interfered with the plaintiffs
life, and offering meaningful anchors. A defense attorney might be more
successful making the defendant appear sympathetic by highlighting the
defendant's lack of responsibility even in cases like these in which only
monetary damages are at issue.
Jury Reject the Law to Do Justice, 30 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 239, 239 (1993); see also Caisa Elizabeth
Royer, Note, The Disobedient Jury: Why Lawmakers Should Codify Jury Nullification, 102 CORNELL
L. REV. 1401, 1402 (2017). Usually, nullification is thought of in the criminal context-juries nullify
to protect a criminal defendant; however, nullification can also occur in the civil system. See, e.g.,
Ballard v. Uribe, 714 P.2d 624, 631 (Cal. 1986) (Mosk, J., concurring) (recognizing that nullification
might occur but should not be considered misconduct); Lars Noah, Civil Jury Nullification, 86 IOWA
L. REV. 1601, 1626-27 (2001) (considering whether nullification should occur in civil cases). There
are debates over whether jury nullification is appropriate. See, e.g., id. at 1658 (considering the pros
and cons of nullification, concluding that civil jury nullification is undemocratic and courts should act
to minimize the risk of nullification); Weinstein, supra, at 244-45 (arguing that procedural safeguards
should result in nullification that promotes justice and is done infrequently). But, given the secrecy of
jury deliberations, in most instances it will likely be difficult to determine whether the jury is
interpreting the law or overriding the law with their own moral judgments.
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CONCLUSION
The present studies underscore that, although jurors might not be
completely capable of identifying the full range of reasons for their award
decisions, their accounts of the key reasons for their judgments offer
important insights. More research with a broader range of cases and
injuries will be required to understand the complex relationships between
juror reasoning and damage award amounts. The request to provide
reasons might reveal that jurors are engaging in a form of civil jury
nullification, as suggested by some of our data. But it also could offer
valuable information about what jurors think are the most significant
consequences of an injury. One important open question is how attorneys
might guide jurors' gist development-and resulting awards-through the
reasons they offer during opening or closing arguments. Although there
are many questions left to investigate, these studies suggest that jurors
could be influenced by, and perhaps even benefit from, such lawyer
guidance in translating their gist judgments to verbatim awards.
